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The Institution of Gender-Based Asylum and Epistemic Injustice: 
A Structural Limit 
Ezgi Sertler 
 
 
 
Abstract 
One of the recent attempts to explore epistemic dimensions of forced 
displacement focuses on the institution of gender-based asylum and hopes to detect 
forms of epistemic injustice within assessments of gender related asylum 
applications. Following this attempt, I aim in this paper to demonstrate how the 
institution of gender-based asylum is structured to produce epistemic injustice at 
least in the forms of testimonial injustice and contributory injustice. This structural 
limit becomes visible when we realize how the institution of asylum is formed to 
provide legitimacy to the institutional comfort the respective migration courts and 
boards enjoy. This institutional comfort afforded to migration boards and courts by 
the existing asylum regimes in the current order of nation-states leads to a systemic 
prioritization of state actors’ epistemic resources rather than that of applicants, 
which, in turn, results in epistemic injustice and impacts the determination of 
applicants’ refugee status. 
 
 
Keywords: epistemic injustice, institutional comfort, gender-based asylum, 
epistemic resources 
 
 
 
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
forced displacement of people has doubled in less than twenty years. In 2015, 65.3 
million people were displaced: 40.8 million of these people were displaced in their 
home countries, 21.5 million were refugees, and 3.2 million were seeking asylum 
(UNHCR 2015).1 Citing these numbers is a dangerous endeavor. While it is one of the 
only ways in which we can articulate what is happening on a larger scale, it is 
inevitably reductive, and it leaves untouched the question of how many of us can 
actually make sense of what it means for 65.3 million people to be displaced in 
many different ways. Attempting to explore the epistemic dimensions of forced 
                                                     
1 For detailed definitions of refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced 
people, see http://www.unrefugees.org/what-is-a-refugee/. 
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displacement is not an easy task. An attempt has to be context-dependent, 
movement-sensitive as well as temporally and spatially specific.  
One of the recent attempts to explore epistemic dimensions of forced 
displacement focuses on the institution of gender-based asylum and hopes to detect 
forms of epistemic injustice within assessments of gender-based asylum applications 
(Wikström 2014). The institution of asylum, in general, refers to the (internationally) 
institutionalized reality of the idea of asylum as an important mechanism for 
international refugee protection as it is practiced through different asylum regimes. 
“Regime,” here, refers to “the institutional environment within which international 
policies are made” (Soroos 1986, 21–23, quoted in Bauman and Miller 2012, 8).2 The 
institution of gender-based asylum, then, refers to the institutionalized reality of the 
idea of gender-based asylum as it is practiced through different asylum systems. I 
use the term “gender-based asylum claims” to refer to a range of different claims 
where gender-related persecution is a relevant consideration for the determination 
of refugee status (UNHCR 2002).3 
In this paper, my aim is to demonstrate that the institution of gender-based 
asylum has a structural limit: it is structured to produce epistemic injustice at least in 
the forms of testimonial injustice and contributory injustice. And I will argue that 
this structural limit can be understood when we realize how the institution of 
gender-based asylum is formed to provide legitimacy to the institutional comfort the 
                                                     
2 Asylum regimes can also be seen as subregimes of the international refugee 
regime defined by Liisa Malkki as the international order “in which contemporary 
‘refugee problems’ are managed” and “in which humanitarian aid and legal 
protection efforts unfold” (Malkki 1995, 517). Also see Betts and Durieux (2007, 
510). 
3 Gender-related persecution, according to the UNHCR, refers to the kind of 
persecution where gender “influences” or “dictates” the type of persecution or 
harm suffered (UNHCR 2002, 3). According to the UNHCR guidelines, gender-related 
persecution has “typically encompassed, although [is] by no means limited to, acts 
of sexual violence, family/domestic violence, coerced family planning, female genital 
mutilation, punishment for transgression of social mores, and discrimination against 
homosexuals” (UNHCR 2002, 1–2). Karen Musalo also notes that “the term ‘gender-
asylum’ is generally understood to describe two types of claims: (1) claims in which 
the form of persecution is unique to, or disproportionately inflicted on women (for 
example, female genital cutting (FGC), domestic violence, rape, forced marriage) 
regardless of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(Refugee Convention) ground for which it is inflicted and (2) claims in which the 
harm may or may not be gendered, but the reason (nexus) it is imposed is because 
of victim’s gender” (Musalo 2010, 46–47). 
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respective migration courts and boards enjoy in decision-making. By institutional 
comfort, I mean the ways in which state actors in migration courts and boards are 
systemically afforded the ability to arbitrarily and ambiguously misinterpret asylum 
applicants’ experiences, cultures, and countries. This institutional comfort afforded 
to migration boards and courts by the existing asylum regimes in the current order 
of nation-states leads to a systemic prioritization of state actors’ epistemic resources 
rather than that of applicants, which, in turn, results in epistemic injustice. 
This paper will proceed in two parts. I will first turn to a recent article by 
Hanna Wikström (2014), which identifies cases of testimonial injustice in 
assessments of gender-based asylum applications in Sweden, and I will underline 
three cases where the institutional comfort of the Swedish migration authorities is 
visible. I will argue that detecting forms of testimonial injustice allows us to observe 
this institutional comfort in three different forms: comfort in denying applicants’ 
experiences, comfort in ignoring available information, and comfort in deciding 
which information/criteria to use. I will then use Gaile Pohlhaus Jr.’s (2012) and 
Kristie Dotson’s (2012, 2014) analyses of dominant epistemic resources in order to 
demonstrate how the institution of gender-based asylum is formed to provide 
legitimacy to this institutional comfort. I will conclude by hinting at a few 
implications of this analysis for the institution of asylum in general. 
 
1. The Institutional Comfort of the Migration Board and Court 
In “Epistemic Injustice in Practice,” Franziska Dübgen notes that “reflecting 
on the workings of epistemic injustice” can be a useful tool in grasping different 
forms of domination and exclusion if “the grammar of epistemic injustice” is used 
for and adapted to the singular case studies (Dübgen 2016, 1, 2, 5). I consider 
Wikström’s (2014) work in “Gender, Culture, and Epistemic Injustice: The 
Institutional Logic in Assessment of Asylum Applications in Sweden” to be one of 
these adaptations. By focusing on the workings of epistemic injustice in gender-
related asylum assessments, Wikström aims to access and articulate specific forms 
of domination and exclusion pervasive in the institutional logic of Sweden. 
Wikström’s empirical material consists of 62 cases of asylum applications of asylum 
seekers from a wide range of countries. Among these 62 cases, Wikström notes, 
“Five women and one man are accepted as refugees, 27 are given subsidiary 
protection, and 29 applicants are denied” (Wikström 2014, 212). The subsidiary 
protection is granted to asylum seekers as a temporary form of protection when 
decision makers in Sweden do not believe the applicant in question qualifies for 
Feminist Philosophy Quarterly, 2018, Vol. 4, Iss. 3, Article 2 
 
Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018  4 
 
refugee status, and thus as a temporary form of protection, it does not offer all the 
benefits of refugee status.4 
UNHCR defines an asylum seeker as follows: 
 
. . . an individual who has sought international protection and whose claim 
for refugee status has not yet been determined. As part of internationally 
recognized obligations to protect refugees on their territories, countries are 
responsible for determining whether an asylum-seeker is a refugee or not. 
. . . This responsibility is derived from the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and relevant regional instruments and is often 
incorporated into national legislation. (UNHCR 2014, 5n2)5 
 
The legal definition of refugee status can be found in Article 1 A(2) of the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees:  
 
The term refugee shall apply to any person who . . . owing to well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or, who, not having a 
nationality and being outside of the country of his former habitual residence 
as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
return to it.6 
 
In what follows, I will briefly summarize how Wikström emphasizes the 
importance of credibility assessments in gender-related asylum applications and 
highlights how testimonial injustice occurs. I will then cite three exchanges 
                                                     
4 https://www.migrationsverket.se/English/Private-individuals/Protection-and-
asylum-in-Sweden/When-you-have-received-a-decision-on-your-asylum-
application/If-you-are-allowed-to-stay/Residence-permits-for-those-granted-
subsidiary-protection-status-.html. Also see:  
http://www.bamf.de/EN/Fluechtlingsschutz/AblaufAsylv/Schutzformen/Subsidiaere
rS/subsidiaerer-schutz-node.html. 
5 Here, I should note that we should not confuse the legal refugee status granted to 
asylum seekers with a more common definition of a refugee as “someone who has 
been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war, or violence” 
(http://www.unrefugees.org/what-is-a-refugee/). 
6 The convention is available at http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/1951-refugee-
convention.html. 
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Wikström narrates between an asylum applicant and the Migration Board or Court 
that have resulted in subsidiary protection rather than refugee status.7 According to 
Wikström, the frequent use of subsidiary protection rather than refugee status in 
gender-related persecution cases suggests that decision makers in Sweden fail to 
recognize the kinds of persecution in question as gender-related persecution, and 
thus fail to recognize those applicants as entitled to asylum (Wikström 2014, 211). 
The following three exchanges can be used to articulate the institutional comfort the 
respective migration courts and boards enjoy in deciding how to read, interpret, and 
process the cultures and the countries in question and the applicants’ experiences 
within them.  
Institutional comfort, here, refers to how migration boards and courts are 
systemically afforded the ability to arbitrarily and ambiguously misinterpret asylum 
applicants’ experiences, cultures, and countries. In other words, the institutional 
comfort calls attention to the discretionary space systemically afforded to state 
actors within their institutional roles and how easily this discretionary space can be 
used to produce inconsistent, ambiguous, and arbitrary assessments of applicants’ 
experiences.8 Even though the existence of discretionary space is not unusual for the 
institution of asylum in general, how easily it can used by state actors to negate 
applicants’ narratives, where gender-related persecution is a consideration, is 
worrisome (Baillot, Cowan, and Munro 2014; McKinnon 2016; Querton 2012). 
The internationally inconsistent approach to gender-based asylum 
exacerbates this situation further. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees initially 
has suggested that gender-based claims and gender-related persecution can be 
evaluated under the category of “membership of a particular social group” (Musalo 
2010; UNHCR 1991).9 They further encouraged states to develop their own 
                                                     
7 I should note here that Wikström’s analysis (2014) is more complicated and 
extends further than what I will be focusing on here. A significant part of the 
analysis, for instance, tracks how “gender-based” cases are understood to mean 
cisgender and heterosexual women’s cases. Although I briefly mention the 
importance of the question of “what counts as gender-based or gender-related” in 
the next paragraph, I do not provide a detailed analysis of that problem in this 
paper. See McKinnon 2016 for further discussion. 
8 I thank the reviewers for helping me clarify this point. 
9 As Musalo (2010) highlights, this was after EXCOM Conclusion No. 39 in 1985 
stating that “states, in the exercise of their sovereignty, are free to adopt the 
interpretation that women asylum-seekers who face harsh and inhuman treatment 
due to their having transgressed the social mores of the society in which they live 
may be considered as a ‘particular social group’ within the meaning of Article 1 A(2) 
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guidelines for gender-based asylum claims, and in 2002 they issued new guidelines 
to encourage a gender-sensitive interpretation to the refugee convention as a whole 
(Musalo and Knight 2002, 59; UNHCR 2002). These efforts, of course, do not 
guarantee a clear and consistent approach to gender-based asylum. In a recent 
report, for instance, Christel Querton notes that despite the common understanding 
that refugee convention requires a gender-inclusive and gender-sensitive approach 
“there are vast and worrying disparities in the way different EU Member States 
handle gender-related asylum claims” (Querton 2012, 2). This is especially 
concerning because how we answer ‘why and how gender matters’ for the 
determination of refugee status relies on how we answer the following questions: At 
what point does discrimination become persecution? What constitutes protection in 
the country of origin? What does it mean to belong to a particular social group? 
What can be counted as gender-based or gender-related? Thus, within this context, I 
take institutional comfort to refer to how the institution of gender-based asylum is 
structured to enable its state-actors to carry out systemically arbitrary and 
ambiguous assessments of applicants’ cases comfortably. 
To start the asylum process in Sweden, applicants register with the Migration 
Board, and the board reaches an initial decision. If the decision is negative, it can be 
appealed at the Migration Court and afterwards at the Migration Court of Appeal. In 
court, Wikström states, the board becomes the counterpart to the applicant and 
their lawyer. The assessments, Wikström says, focus on the reasons for asylum and 
the credibility of the applicant’s narrative. The applicant has to present and justify 
that her fear of persecution is well grounded. That is to say, the applicant has to 
provide information about their country and their position within their country of 
origin, which will later be compared with the “available information” that the 
migration authorities have on the country in question. In Sweden’s case, this 
available information is usually retrieved from the country information database: 
 
The approach to, and nature of, Country of Origin Information in Sweden is 
factual. . . . Lifos [database] is a compilation of “facts.” The idea is that there 
are a number of observable facts about countries and societies that can be 
captured and structured in a database. The underlying logic seems to be that 
anyone . . . can use these facts to come to the right (and thus the same) 
                                                     
of the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention” (http://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/excom/exconc/3ae68c43a8/refugee-women-international-protection.html). 
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conclusion.” (Flärd 2007, 38, quoted in Wikström 2014, 215; Wikström’s 
brackets and ellipses)10 
 
This comparison between the information given by the applicant and the 
information retrieved from the database is crucial because it allows authorities to 
justify first whether the applicant’s reasons for asylum are well grounded and 
further whether there is possibility of protection in the country of origin, which, 
then, negates the reasons for asylum application. Within this context, Wikström 
suggests, “asylum assessments largely rest on credibility assessments,” which leads 
to the argument that asylum applicants suffer from testimonial injustice (Wikström 
2014, 210).11 
Testimonial injustice, for Miranda Fricker, “occurs when prejudice causes a 
hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word” (Fricker 2007, 1). 
The prejudice in question tracks “the subject through different dimensions of social 
activity—economic, educational, professional, sexual, legal, political, religious, and 
so on,” and therefore relates to social identity in a systematic way (Fricker 2007, 27). 
Fricker calls such prejudice “identity prejudice” and argues that in a central case of 
testimonial injustice, a speaker “receives a credibility deficit owing to identity 
prejudice in the hearer” (28). In other words, testimonial injustice occurs when 
                                                     
10 Wikström (2014, 215) also notes that Lifos (the country information database) 
relies on a realist/positivist paradigm that the migration authorities depend on in 
forming their beliefs. 
11 Wikström defines epistemic injustice at the beginning of the article by presenting 
Fricker’s definition of testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice together and 
does not necessarily announce for every case she mentions whether it amounts to 
testimonial injustice, hermeneutical injustice, or both. One case where she clearly 
indicates an instance of hermeneutical injustice is related to the use of gender in 
law, which I will not discuss here. However, since the cases (and especially what I 
choose to emphasize about the cases here) bring up the issue of credibility 
assessments, I’m categorizing them as testimonial. I should also note here that 
because Fricker’s (2007) initial discussion of hermeneutical injustice assumes one set 
of collective hermeneutical resources and does not differentiate between making 
sense to ourselves and making sense to (different) others (as discussed by Dotson 
[2012], Mason [2011], Medina [2013], and Pohlhaus [2012]), applying that notion to 
asylum applicants and their cases has to be done very carefully (cf. Rusin and Franke 
2010). That is one reason why I think a discussion of hermeneutical injustice in the 
context of gender-based asylum should be addressed in a separate paper. Also see 
Medina 2017 for further discussion on hermeneutical injustice. 
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there is an identity-prejudicial credibility deficit in the hearer that is caused by a 
negative identity-prejudicial stereotype, which is defined by Fricker as 
 
a widely held disparaging association between a social group and one or 
more attributes, where this association embodies a generalization that 
displays some (typically, epistemically culpable) resistance to counter-
evidence owing to an ethically bad affective investment. (Fricker 2007, 35) 
 
The following exchanges between the Migration Board and the applicants 
demonstrate how the board gives applicants a deflated level of credibility based on 
its stereotypical understanding of the culture, the culture’s norms, and how the 
culture forms identities. In these exchanges, we witness the Migration Board 
demonstrating a strong “disinclination to believe” in the applicants’ testimonies 
(Dotson 2012, 27). For Wikström, “epistemic injustice becomes evident as the 
reasoning of the authorities shows how arguments of culture are primarily used to 
negate individual claims, and in that resistance to and deviations from dominant 
cultural norms [that the Board assumes/considers itself to know] are not seen 
credible” (Wikström 2014, 214; citing Fricker 2007). “As such,” she continues, 
“epistemic injustice” [or testimonial injustice] occurs when applicants suffer from “a 
deflated level of credibility” compared to other sources of information (Wikström 
2014, 215). 
It seems to me, then, that detecting cases of testimonial injustice in 
assessment of asylum applications allows us to observe the institutional comfort the 
Migration Board enjoys in three different forms: comfort in denying applicants’ 
experiences, comfort in ignoring available information, and comfort in deciding 
which information/criteria to use. In what follows, I will discuss each comfort 
through an exchange between an applicant and the migration authorities. 
 
A. The comfort in denying applicants’ experiences: 
This comfort refers to the ease with which the Migration Board is able to 
reject the reality of an applicant’s experiences. In other words, it refers to how easily 
the Migration Board can reject a lived reality as narrated by an applicant especially 
when the lived reality does not correspond to how decision makers understand 
these applicants, cultures, and countries (Wikström 2014, 214). Wikström explains:  
 
Sara is an applicant of Kurdish descent and from Iraq. She claims that her 
family arranged for her to be married against her will. Despite this, she had a 
sexual relation with a work colleague of hers. One day Sara’s brother caught 
the couple in her family’s residence and a fight and shooting ensued. Sara 
fled and went to the police. An officer told her he would have killed her 
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himself had she been his sister, and that the police could not do anything 
“since it was an honour-related crime” (Verdict 15:2). The Board (MB) turned 
Sara’s application down because it did not find her credible: 
 
MB: It is odd and not very likely that she would initiate a sexual 
relation with another man when she knows she is going to marry her 
cousin. . . . That she would be so blinded by love and disregard the 
consequences is not a reasonable explanation, with the culture that is 
prevalent in northern Iraq and with her family traditions in mind. . . . 
Furthermore, it must be considered striking that, at her age, an 
arranged marriage has not occurred earlier. (Verdict 15: 3) 
[. . .] 
 
[When] Sara responds to a number of things she claims the Board has 
misunderstood, she also states that: “It is not strange for women to initiate 
secret relationships.” (Verdict 15: 4) 
(Wikström 2014, 214, quoting the Migration Board verdict; unbracketed 
ellipses are Wikström’s)12 
 
In this case, we witness the Migration Board giving Sara a deflated level of 
credibility by relying on stereotypes that label her as a subject that cannot possibly 
show any agency within a “homogeneous” culture that has full control over its 
subjects.13 The interplay between the cultural stereotypes the court holds in terms 
of what kind of a culture Sara’s culture is and the identity-prejudicial stereotype 
about how a woman in her circumstances behaves (must behave) proves to the 
board that Sara’s testimony cannot be believed. Her experiences are found unreal 
mostly because her culture is interpreted in an essentialist way. Essentialist, here, 
refers to the way in which cultures are interpreted to have an essence that is static 
and present for every member in the same way. As Trina Grillo states:  
                                                     
12 As I have mentioned above, the court later grants Sara subsidiary protection 
(Wikström 2014, 215). It is important to remember here that, first, subsidiary 
protection only offers a temporary form of protection and does not offer all the 
benefits of a refugee status. Second, subsidiary protection in this case, as Wikström 
notes, suggest that the persecution Sara suffers from is not recognized as the kind of 
persecution that qualifies for refugee status in light of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
Third, I should note here that Sara is granted subsidiary protection only after initially 
being denied asylum by the board.  
13 Also see Narayan (1997) on totalizations/totalizing pictures of cultures (15) and 
“death by culture”. 
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An essentialist outlook assumes that the experience of the group under 
discussion is a stable one, one with a clear meaning, a meaning constant 
through time, space, and different historical, social, political, and personal 
contexts. (Grillo 1995, 19) 
 
This interpretation, while rendering applicants’ cultures intelligible for decision 
makers, also demonstrates how gender-based violence is not only salient but also 
“endemic and essential” to those cultures (McKinnon 2016, 30).14 As a result, an 
essentialist frame of culture places gender-based violence “at the core of what it 
means to live as a woman in the region and these countries” (McKinnon 2016, 30). It 
also ends up “racializing” and “ethnicizing” gender-based violence as well, where 
gender-based violence is understood to be an essential problem of certain “races” 
and “ethnicities” (McKinnon 2016, 30). In other words, when the board listens to 
Sara, they do so through a frame in which “non-white” women seem intelligible 
insofar as they are without any agency, and their cultures seem intelligible insofar as 
they are all oppressive. Thus, the board uses the fact that Sara’s narrative does not 
fit into a monolithic “image of an average third world woman” who is “powerless” 
and doesn’t have any agency as a reason to find her experiences unintelligible 
(Mohanty 1988, 65, 66). What is striking here is the comfort, the ease, with which 
the Migration Board can find her experiences to be unreal or unlikely to occur when 
she tells them specifically that they are not. 
 
B. The comfort in ignoring available information: 
This comfort refers to the ease with which the Migration Board can overlook 
and disregard the information provided in applicants’ testimonies. This comfort can 
be read as both underlying and caused by the first comfort I identified. This is 
because the ease with which the board declares an applicant’s experiences unreal 
due to essentialist approaches to cultures enables its members to overlook the 
available information provided in the testimony. At the same time, ignoring the 
available information that is present in testimony (such as the fact that it is not 
strange for women to start sexual relationships) allows the board to sustain its 
approach to Sara’s “culture.” Thus, giving applicants a deflated level of credibility 
prevents the board from paying attention to the information present in testimonies 
or enables them to disregard the available information present in testimonies. This 
becomes clear in Nesrin’s case:  
 
                                                     
14 Also see McKinnon 2012. 
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Nesrin is of Kurdish origins and from Iraq. She claims to have had a love affair 
with Omed. Nesrin’s family rejected Omed’s proposal to Nesrin, as she was 
promised to a cousin of hers. As a result of the proposal, Nesrin’s family 
repeatedly abused and threatened her and Omed. While the couple 
prepared to escape the country, Omed was murdered by Nesrin’s family and 
Nesrin managed to escape through the aid of a women’s organization. 
(Wikström 2014, 212–213) 
 
Wikström explains that in the case of Nesrin, 
 
the Board finds the protection of abused women in northern Iraq 
satisfactory:  
 
MB: For abused women there is generally a possibility of good enough 
protection against HV15 (Verdict 12: 4).  
 
They further state that:  
 
MB: Nesrin did not make contact with the police, other authorities or 
alternative mediation institutions in Iraq [for her protection] before 
seeking international protection (Verdict 12: 5). 
(Wikström 2014, 215; bracketed insertion is Wikström’s) 
 
In Nesrin’s case, the board does not believe her testimony that the protection in her 
own country was not a possibility anymore. The board seems to question Nesrin’s 
capacity to evaluate her own situation and decide that “going to the police was not 
an option.” More importantly, the board (in order to maintain that there was 
sufficient protection in Iraq) ignores the fact that Nesrin’s brother, uncle, and cousin 
were employed by the police force. Thus, they ignore the fact that going to the 
police for Nesrin would be equivalent to going back to her family. Furthermore, the 
board ignores “Nesrin’s claim that it was a women’s shelter that helped her to 
escape” (Wikström 2014, 216). As Wikström highlights, ignoring available 
information seems to be a technique that is frequently used by the Migration Board 
in order to suggest that the country of origin is still relatively safe and therefore the 
international protection is not needed.16 
                                                     
15 Honour-related violence. 
16 Despite the fact that the court later ends up giving Nesrin subsidiary protection, it 
is important to note here that, similar to Sara’s case, her application for asylum is 
initially denied by the board. However, the court claims that “according to the 
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C. The comfort in deciding which information/criteria to use: 
This comfort refers to the ease with which the migration boards can be 
arbitrary and ambiguous in their decision-making processes. Wikström describes a 
third case that demonstrates this comfort: 
 
Almas and Afya are both from Syria; they both refer to HV and claim to have 
been severely abused by their families and threatened to death; they applied 
for asylum during the same period of time. In the case of Almas, the ruling 
court relies on six both national and international country reports, based on 
which the Court concludes that the lack of protection in the country of origin 
is established by law:  
 
MC: HV and murders take place all over Syria. Syrian law statutes 
impunity or punishment mitigation in honour-related violations. The 
State indicates that 30 such murders take place every year. NGOs put 
the number at 2,000–3,000 such cases. (Verdict 21: 7)17 
 
The case of Almas is awarded refugee status. In the case of Afya (Verdict 24), 
only the internal report from the Swedish Board is used as country 
information. The Board, which in its claim stresses the equal legal status of 
murders with and without honour motives, states: 
 
MB: Generally considered, the number of honour killings has gone 
down in the country in recent years. It is said that people have 
become more enlightened and changed their attitudes in this matter. 
Men more often refrain from killing in the name of honour because 
they know they will be sentenced to harsh prison terms when they 
are not granted sentence reductions. (Verdict 24:4) 
                                                     
country information, the authorities in the Kurdish area have made several efforts to 
stop HV and murders, but that the protection is not necessarily good enough” 
(Wikström 2014, 216). Nevertheless, the court gives Nesrin subsidiary protection 
instead of refugee status because it argues that the persecution Nesrin suffers from 
is not gender-related persecution since the man she had a relationship with is killed 
as well (213). And because her persecution is not registered as gender-related, she is 
not granted refugee status. 
17 Wikström notes that “the country report from which the number is taken reads 
‘200–300’ such cases, not 2000–3000, indicating that the Court misrepresented the 
number in this citation” (Wikström 2014, 217n4). 
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This is contradictory to statements made in the case of Almas (Verdict 21). It 
also differs from what the Court, in the case of Afya (Verdict 24: 7), chooses 
to stress regarding the same country information, namely that HV is said to 
have “deep cultural roots,” that the “police see threats and less serious 
offences as part of upbringing” and that HV has not been a high priority. The 
Court also states that: 
 
MC: Any deviation from the family’s rules can lead to punishments. 
Sometimes you kill the person wronged. Many young women are 
married off to older men in return for payment. . . . NGOs report that 
between 200–300 women are killed in the name of honour each year. 
The authorities, however, believe that the number is 30–35. (Verdict 
24: 9) 
 
The court refers lack of protection in the country of origin to “habits of 
culture,” and Afya is granted subsidiary protection. (Wikström 2014, 215; 
Wikström’s emphases and ellipses) 
 
The fact that Almas and Afya are both from Syria and claim honour-related violence 
does not automatically render their cases the same. However, what is striking here 
is the comfort of the Migration Board and Court in turning to different reports 
concerning honour-related violence in Syria and not identifying why they do so. In 
other words, the migration authorities can with ease refer to the reports of NGOs or 
not, choose different authorities to count on, and in fact offer two different 
interpretations of Syria with respect to honour-related violence. This suggests that 
the Migration Board and Court can read, interpret, and process the cultures and the 
countries in question as they please. Wikström thinks that the decision processes 
described in Almas’s and Afya’s cases “show the arbitrary nature of the use of 
country information” by the migration authorities (Wikström 2014, 215). The use of 
country information can be arbitrary, but the fact that the authorities can arbitrarily 
decide which information/criteria to use, speaks to the institutional comfort they 
enjoy. Thus, the problem is not only that they rely on essentializing and racialized 
discourses of culture and different country reports, but that they can also be 
ambiguous and arbitrary in their reliance. This is to say that the courts can easily 
seem arbitrary about their decisions to choose what information to use, and they 
can also be ambiguous about how they will use that information. 
I have tried to demonstrate above that the Migration Board and Court enjoy 
a certain institutional comfort that we can disentangle by following an analysis of 
testimonial injustice in assessments of gender-based asylum applications in Sweden. 
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This comfort can be seen in three forms: comfort in denying applicants’ experiences, 
comfort in ignoring available information, and finally comfort in deciding which 
information/criteria to use for evaluations. An analysis of testimonial injustice allows 
us to address the unwarranted credibility deficit the asylum applicants suffer from. 
However, what seems to underlie the cases of testimonial injustice is that the board 
and court can afford to be arbitrary and ambiguous when negating and ignoring 
applicants’ experiences, when selectively determining what is salient about the 
country in question, and when structuring what “good enough” or “efficient” 
protection looks like in the country in question. In these cases, the problem is not 
that the decision makers rely on other reports such as country of origin reports and 
expert reports to assess these claims. The problem is that the decision makers can 
afford to be ambiguous and arbitrary in their reliance in a way that usually ends up 
negating applicants’ contributions to these cases. In other words, the Migration 
Board and Court can afford to be arbitrary and ambiguous in their reconstruction of 
applicants’ experiences, cultures, and countries during the review process. Being 
able to afford to be arbitrary and ambiguous in processing the cultures, the 
countries, and the applicants’ experiences in a way that negates applicants’ own 
experiences is what comprises this institutional comfort. And this institutional 
comfort performed in the review process at the same time performs the authority of 
the current order of nation-states in the existing asylum regimes. In what follows, I 
aim to show how the institution of gender-based asylum structurally legitimizes this 
institutional comfort and why that is important. 
 
2. The Structural Limit: Legitimization of the Institutional Comfort 
This institutional comfort is not limited to Sweden’s Migration Board and 
Courts. Other scholars have pointed out that applicants in gender-related asylum 
cases in the UK and the US get assigned lower epistemic authority and credibility 
compared to any other source of information (e.g., country of origin reports, 
websites providing information about these countries, or experts) and suffer from 
inconsistent, ambiguous and arbitrary assessments (Baillot, Cowan, and Munro 
2014; Kelson 1997; Kennady 1998; McKinnon 2016; Neacsu 2003). This is to say that 
these dynamics that we were able to identify and discuss for these cases are not 
isolated incidents: they are part of a process that seems to be continuously and 
regularly juxtaposing how asylum applicants make sense of their situations with how 
“authorities in respective countries” make sense of applicants’ situations. The 
question I would like to ask is, Can the institution of gender-based asylum as it is 
practiced today allow an environment where “how applicants make sense of their 
situations” can be acknowledged and affirmed? I think that the answer is most likely 
no. This is because, I argue, the institution of asylum is built to legitimize the 
institutional comfort of migration courts and boards. And this legitimization 
Sertler: The Institution of Gender-Based Asylum and Epistemic Injustice: A Structural Limit 
 
Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018  15 
 
 
prioritizes the epistemic resources of the boards and courts rather than that of 
applicants. This legitimization further overlooks and actively ignores applicants’ 
epistemic resources. Epistemic resources, here, refers to various sense-making 
mechanisms that we need in order to make sense of what is salient and relevant in a 
given situation.18 
In order to know the world well, Pohlhaus (2012) notes, a knower attends to 
her world. When a knower attends to her world, her particular location in the world 
matters since it determines what is more likely for her to notice and attend to (what 
is salient and relevant for her).19 Knowers, she continues, need epistemic resources 
that can make sense of their experiences of attending and noticing things in the 
world. These epistemic resources are developed and circulated by groups of other 
knowers who attend to the world in different ways. Thus, she says, in a given 
epistemic landscape, it becomes important for a knower to be a part of the process 
of developing epistemic resources that are calibrated based on what is salient for 
her and at the same time enjoy the already circulating epistemic resources’ ability to 
articulate what is salient for her.20 However, Pohlhaus notes that “in a socially 
stratified society, some persons are situated in positions that allow their experiences 
to count more in the development and circulation of epistemic resources” (Pohlhaus 
2012, 718). Thus, when the dominant epistemic resources (developed and 
circulated) do not suffice to make sense of what is salient for certain knowers who 
are situated in particular ways, these knowers need to “recalibrate and/or create 
new epistemic resources” in order to “know the world more adequately” (Pohlhaus 
2012, 720). However, since creating new epistemic resources is an interdependent 
endeavor, that is, one that cannot be completed only by individual efforts, it is easy 
to imagine different groups that maintain and cultivate different epistemic 
resources.  
Looking at Wikström’s narration of Sara’s and Nesrin’s testimonies, for 
instance, we see that they know “perfectly well what is happening” to them 
(Pohlhaus 2012, 725). As knowers, they have the epistemic tools (developed and 
[re]calibrated collectively) to make sense of their experiences and what those 
experiences mean within the context of their country. In other words, they have 
their own sense-making mechanisms. What seems to happen is that the epistemic 
resources that the migration authorities use to make sense of the world are not 
                                                     
18 Even though I discuss decision makers’ epistemic resources here, Akram (2000) 
points out that epistemic resources of advocates and lawyers can also be 
problematic.  
19 Also see Alcoff 2007, Code 1993, Harding 1991, and Hill Collins 2009. 
20 For Dotson (2014), the former relates to the efficiency of epistemic resources, and 
the latter relates to sufficiency of them. 
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calibrated for and do not allow the authorities to understand the “intelligibility” of 
Sara’s and Nesrin’s claims (Pohlhaus 2012, 725). As Pohlhaus suggests, “the 
resources that would call their [the board’s] attention to those aspects of the world 
to which they do not attend are the very ones under contestation” (728). Thus, it is 
nearly impossible to demonstrate to the board that the epistemic resources they are 
using to attend to the parts of the world are inadequate without using the epistemic 
resources that the board dismisses to begin with.  
The Migration Board’s insistence on using the dominant epistemic resources 
that cannot make sense of the applicants’ testimonies is at the same time a 
systematic refusal and active undermining of different hermeneutical resources 
developed and calibrated by the applicants themselves. In other words, the 
Migration Board’s refusal to find Sara and Nesrin credible is not just a mere “not 
understanding” or an “inability” but an active, systematic and coordinated 
misinterpretation of the world as it makes sense to Nesrin and Sara (Pohlhaus 2012, 
731). In Sara’s case, the board cannot understand that it is not strange for a woman 
to initiate secret relationships. In Nesrin’s case, the board ignores the fact that that 
she couldn’t go to the police and the fact that a women’s shelter helped her escape. 
What seems obvious in both cases is that the board selectively and systematically 
refers to the epistemic resources that makes sense of the country, the culture, and 
Nesrin’s and Sara’s identities in a way that ends up negating Nesrin’s and Sara’s 
experiences.  
Pohlhaus suggests that willful hermeneutical ignorance occurs “when 
dominantly situated knowers refuse to acknowledge epistemic tools developed from 
the experienced world of those situated marginally” (2012, 715). “Such refusals,” 
she continues, “allow dominantly situated knowers to misunderstand, misinterpret, 
and/or ignore whole parts of the world” (715).21 For Dotson, in this case, the board 
commits contributory injustice: The board’s “willful hermeneutical ignorance in 
maintaining and utilizing structurally prejudiced hermeneutical resources thwarts a 
knower’s ability to contribute to shared epistemic resources within a given epistemic 
community by compromising her epistemic agency” (Dotson 2012, 32; my 
emphasis).22 Thus, in the cases listed above we witness how the migration 
                                                     
21 Pohlhaus suggests that “willful hermeneutical ignorance may be a type of the 
broader category of contributory injustice insofar as the former is one way 
dominant knowers can refuse to acknowledge the signiﬁcance of contributions of 
marginalized knowers to the general knowledge pool” (2012, 734). 
22 For Dotson, epistemic agency concerns “the ability to utilize persuasively shared 
epistemic resources within a given epistemic community in order to participate in 
knowledge production and, if required, revision of those same resources” (2012, 
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authorities can comfortably utilize dominant hermeneutical resources, disregard 
different hermeneutical resources, dismiss applicants’ contributions to the shared 
epistemic resources, and maintain its ignorance with respect to the applicants’ 
epistemic resources and experiences as a matter of process. 
Migration boards and courts do this because the epistemological framework 
that maintains and sustains the institution of gender-based asylum is structured to 
provide “legitimacy” to arbitrary and ambiguous use of the epistemic resources of 
the authorities in the given nation-state that is evaluating the asylum applications as 
a matter of procedure. The problem here is not only that the institution of gender-
based asylum structurally marginalizes and ignores epistemic resources of asylum 
applicants, but also that the structure of the institution is, to use Dotson’s 
terminology, built to “uphold” and “preserve” the epistemic resources of the 
evaluative mechanisms in the respective nation-states (Dotson 2014, 131). In other 
words, the institution of gender-based asylum is structured not to provide the 
conditions for the possibility of asylum applicants’ epistemic resources to be 
legitimized. 
The epistemological framework that sustains the institution of gender-based 
asylum and provides the legitimacy mentioned above is supported further by 
another one: “the contemporary order of sovereign nation-states as given” (Malkki 
1995, 502). Liisa Malkki calls this “the national order of things.” As Malkki argues, 
“the national order of things secretes displacement, as well as prescriptive 
correctives for displacement” (516). This is also to say that the entire legal, political, 
social, historical, and economic culture at work positions refugee claimants as 
problems for the benefit of the states of refuge (Rusin and Franke 2010). Within this 
national order of things, “the refugee determination process performs the state’s 
authority to protect the freedom of its citizenry, through the right to exclude 
refugee claimants on grounds of security and past behavior, and to demand 
particular manners of civil conduct from those who seek refuge” (Rusin and Franke 
2010, 195).  
This national order of things, for example, is reflected in the arguments made 
by opponents to gender asylum. As Karen Musalo suggests, there are usually two 
kinds of arguments used against gender-based asylum and gender-related 
persecution (Musalo 2010, 47). The first one states that the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol were never meant to extend international 
protection to “domestic” and “private” issues. The second one asserts that 
accepting gender-based and gender-related claims “will open the floodgates and 
result in a deluge of claims” (Musalo 2010, 48). Despite UNHCR’s efforts to 
                                                     
24). She also notes that her definition of epistemic agency is influenced by Cynthia 
Townley’s (2003) definition of agency. 
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encourage a gender-sensitive interpretation of the refugee convention, many 
countries’ failure to follow through guidelines concerning gender-related 
persecution, their failure to apply their own guidelines in a consistent manner 
(without forgetting that consistent does not mean just), and their arbitrary 
interpretation of gender-related persecution demonstrate to us that the current 
order of nation-states and their border control politics also influence the evaluative 
mechanisms of those states. Thus, the contemporary order of sovereign nation-
states as given facilitates the institutional comfort these migration courts and 
boards enjoy and legitimizes the epistemological framework that upholds and 
preserves the dominant epistemic resources, which delegitimize applicants’ 
experiences. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
I have tried to demonstrate that the institution of gender-based asylum has a 
structural limit, that is, it is structured to produce epistemic injustice at least in the 
forms of testimonial injustice and contributory injustice. This structural limit 
becomes visible when we realize how the institution of gender-based asylum is 
structured to provide legitimacy to the institutional comfort the respective 
migration courts and boards enjoy in deciding how to read, interpret, and process 
the cultures and the countries in question and the applicants’ experiences within 
them. In other words, I have followed Wikström’s attempt to identify epistemic 
injustice in gender-based asylum cases and used her article as a case study to show 
how migration boards and courts are systematically afforded the ability to arbitrarily 
and ambiguously misinterpret asylum applicants’ experiences, cultures, and 
countries. I’ve suggested that although testimonial injustice can indicate the 
unwarranted credibility deficit applicants suffer from, contributory injustice can 
demonstrate to us how epistemic resources of decision makers are prioritized. 
Paying attention to this systemic prioritization allows us to underline systemic 
misinterpretation afforded to migration boards by the existing asylum regimes in the 
current order of nation-states. Following this analysis, I think it is important to raise 
at least two questions: (1) What is it that a structural and epistemological analysis 
can do in this case? (2) Can this analysis be extended to the institution of asylum in 
general? I now try to answer these questions briefly.  
First, it is important to articulate what a structural and epistemological 
analysis can enable in the context of gender-based asylum. I should note here that 
the point of this analysis is not to overlook or undermine the success of how gender-
based asylum is used by advocates and lawyers to obtain refugee status for many 
asylum seekers; the point is to understand the failures of this institution better. If 
the institution of gender-based asylum is structured to produce epistemic injustice, 
then we have to ask: What do we need to pay more attention to in developing 
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guidelines, practices, and policies for gender-related persecution in order to make 
sure that states comply with the 1951 Refugee Convention when considering 
gender-related persecution? If, for example, in order to overcome this structural 
limitation, migration boards and courts need to be able to learn different epistemic 
resources and to shift among different epistemic resources, the question to ask is, 
what kinds of institutional practices could enable that? Both Dotson (2012) and 
Pohlhaus (2012) point out that learning different epistemic resources and being able 
to use them is not impossible, but it is quite difficult. This is because it requires a 
fluency in differing hermeneutical resources, which is not easy to achieve.23 This 
difficulty further raises the question of what institutional practices can carry 
migration boards and courts and their evaluative mechanisms closer to that fluency 
without abusing the material, social, historical, legal, and political power they have 
held. This question is crucial to remind ourselves that “the law cannot on its own 
create justice” (Davis 2005, 88). Thus, a structural and epistemological analysis in 
the context of gender-based asylum can allow us to acknowledge the limits of 
national and international law, which is significant for projects that plan to create 
more just institutional practices (Davis 2005, 88). 
Furthermore, it is important to ask whether this analysis can be extended to 
the institution of asylum in general. Is the institution of asylum structured to 
produce different forms of epistemic injustice? Although answering this question 
requires a more detailed and extensive discussion, I would like to mention a few 
points that speak to the importance of raising that question. When discussing 
refugee claimants in Canada, Jill Rusin and Mark Franke cite an excerpt from an 
interview with a Nigerian refugee claimant. This claimant complains about the lack 
of clear guidelines and criteria in courts’ interpretation of race, political opinion, and 
the social and political context in the countries of origin: 
 
To go to the level of the hearing proper, I don’t know the criteria that they 
are using to make their judgements. I told you before about the Nigerian 
from Viessa state, Orgoniland. I felt he should have won status here but he 
lost his case . . . I know that that area is being wracked by violence between 
the indigenes and the government. The people from the area produce the 
wealth of the country while they are being neglected. They are 
environmentally being destroyed by the international oil companies: Mobil, 
Shell, Chevron. Based on my experience of what is going on in that area of 
the country, anybody from that area is at risk, a refugee in their own country. 
I feel if somebody from that area can lose his case, do I stand a good chance 
of winning mine? At least give some clear guidelines. You can make your 
                                                     
23 Also see “incommensurability” in Schutte (1998). 
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claim on race, religion, political opinion . . . but race in what way? It’s not 
that clear. They are making this claim based on their political opinion or for 
religious reasons only to be told it is not this. . . . It is not fair for people to 
see the process as a gambling thing . . . cause you never know if you are 
going to win or not. (Lokhorst 2003, quoted in Rusin and Franke 2010, 188–
189) 
 
This excerpt suggests that decision makers’ inconsistent, ambiguous, and 
arbitrary assessments of applicants’ cultures, countries, and experiences can create 
problems for asylum claims other than those that are based on gender. In other 
words, state actors’ approaches to asylum grounds such as race, political opinion, 
and religion, can also be arbitrary, ambiguous and inconsistent in a systemic and 
persistent fashion.  
In addition, if we recall the five categories in the 1951 Refugee Convention—
race, religion, nationality, political opinion, and membership of a particular social 
group—we can see that it matters significantly whether intersectional analyses can 
play a significant role in decision makers’ approach to applicants’ cases. Despite the 
fact that asylum applicants’ experiences can speak to multiple grounds (such as race, 
gender, religion, and political opinion) in the refugee convention, it is not unusual 
for decision makers to approach applicants’ cases with “expectations based on 
inappropriate nonintersectional contexts” (Crenshaw 1991, 1251).24 For instance, 
some applicants are denied asylum on being found too feminine or not gay enough 
or based on the importance of class not being understood in relation to gender or 
based on gender-based violence and sexual orientation-based violence not being 
considered at the same time (McKinnon 2012, 2016; Neilson 2005; McDonald-
Norman 2017). These issues show us that it is crucial to acknowledge the failures of 
the dominant epistemic resources employed by decision makers and to discuss the 
structural limits of the institution of asylum in general. 
The UNHCR, in a 2012 report, states that “wealthier countries that are 
geographically removed from crisis zones implement numerous measures to deter 
and prevent the arrival of asylum-seekers” (UNHCR 2012, 9). This is to say that 
current asylum procedures are further influenced by how states manage 
immigration in general. According to the UNHCR (2012), the increasing border 
control mechanisms25 make the institution of asylum less and less meaningful as a 
way of protecting refugees. However, the practice of asylum not only is made more 
                                                     
24 Also see Anthias 2012, McKinnon 2012, and McKinnon 2016.  
25 Border control mechanisms such as “border closures, push-backs, interception at 
sea, visa requirements, carrier sanctions, and offshore border control” (UNHCR 2012, 
10). 
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difficult and complicated, but also is “fraught with inconsistencies” (UNHCR 2012, 
10). States do not have a consistent understanding of asylum and offer very 
different types of protection. These inconsistencies, the UNHCR notes, undermine 
the integrity of the international refugee protection system (2012, 10). Within this 
context, then, paying attention to the structural limits of the institution of asylum is 
not only important for reforming or rebuilding asylum practices but also for “re-
imagining” and building other types of institutions, ideas, and strategies for 
international protection (Davis 2005, 71). Diagnosing and recording the failings of 
the institution of asylum, in other words, can be useful for evaluating how “we” 
respond to forced displacement and for coming up with different ways to address 
forced displacement. 
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